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Looking Through and Beyond Conflicts: Communal 
Violence and the Social Order in Hyderabad (India)
Emanuela Mangiarotti
University of Genoa, Department of Science Education, Genoa
Communalism permeates the political, academic, media and everyday discourse in and about India. As a domin -
ant interpretive framework, it expresses a particular politics of interfaith relations that normalises socio-political
conflicts and violence intersecting with gender, class and caste relations. These intersections emerge in the ex-
periences, practices and spaces of marginality and violence, revealing both the mechanisms of their normalisa-
tion in the context of communal violence and the experience of living within, through and despite it. Everyday
life becomes the privileged context for reading communalism in light of a systematic reorganising of the gender-
socio-economic governance, and the possibility to interrogate it. Based on an ethnographic study carried out in
Hyderabad between 2009 and 2012, the paper reveals a politics of communal violence embedded in everyday so -
cial practices. It shows that the gender-socio-economic governance is not parallel to communalism but in fact
constitutive of its logic and practices. The paper offers a perspective on how socio-political conflicts become ac-
tualised in a social order and how agency within such contexts unfolds as awareness of and action upon the
space/possibility of their reconfiguration. 
Keywords: communalism, communal violence, caste, gender, socio-economic order, intersectionality
1 Introduction
Communalism permeates the political, academic, me-
dia and everyday discourse in and about India. Any
effort to comprehend past and present discussions on
modern and contemporary India will have to account
for communalism as a dominant interpretive frame-
work  of  interfaith  relations  and  the  ways  analysts,
commentators  and  ordinary  people  use  it  to  make
sense  of  the  tensions  inherent  in  India’s  national
project(s). 
Broadly speaking, communalism has two, closely in-
terrelated  meanings:  it  designates  conflicts  between
religious  communities  and  qualifies  politics  and
groups as sectarian.1 Building on the literature,  this
paper starts from the observation that the communal
lens renders invisible the workings of multiple dimen-
1 Communalism is not exclusively associated with Hindus 
and Muslims, but with “religious communities” in general. 
Here I analyze its implications for Hindu-Muslim relations. 
For a historical analysis of the connotations attiributed to 
the “communal” see (Aloysius 1998; Jalal 1996, 1997; Mah-
mood 1993; Pandey 2006).
sions of power in the social space of interfaith rela-
tions and overlooks some fundamental historical and
sociological issues at the heart of Indian politics and
society (Aloysius 1998; Gottschalk and Doniger 2000;
Pandey 2006; Shani 2007).  In that sense, communal-
ism expresses a particular politics and practice of in-
terfaith relations. 
In particular, the paper shows that gender and so-
cio-economic power differentials do not unfold paral-
lel  to  communalism but  are,  in  fact,  constitutive  of
communal material-discursive practices.2 To do so, it
delves into the mechanisms whereby communal vio-
lence unfolds at the intersection of gender, class and
caste relations, between and across religious commu-
nity boundaries. It then discusses how communalism
2 According to Barad (2003, 822), “the relationship between 
the material and the discursive is one of mutual entailment. 
Neither is articulated/articulable in the absence of the other;
mattier and meaning are mutually articulated. Neither dis-
cursive practices nor material phenomena are ontologically 
or epistemologically prior. Neither can be explained in terms
of the other. Neither has privileged status in determining 
the other.”
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silences specific subject positions and the possibility
of  alternative  practices  of  interfaith  relations,  espe-
cially in situations of crisis, when tensions over rela-
tions of power unsettle an otherwise normalised social
hierarchy. 
This paper is part of a larger study based on a four-
year-research in India, which addresses the question
of how communalism affects existing analytical and
socio-political perspectives and their capacity to em-
brace  possibilities  of  social  change.  It  interrogates
how a politics of communal violence becomes embed-
ded in social  practices,  normalising violence against
certain subjects and the relations of power acted out
within,  between  and  across  the  boundaries  of  reli-
gious communities. In that sense, the paper also pro-
poses  a  perspective  on  how socio-political  conflicts
become actualised in a social order and how  agency
within such contexts unfolds as awareness of and ac-
tion upon the space/possibility  of  their  reconfigura-
tion.
All  ethnographic  research  materials  referred  to  in
the paper – which include semi-structured interviews,
group conversations, photography and participant ob-
servation  –  were  collected  in  so-called  “riot-prone”
and “communally-sensitive” areas of Hyderabad’s Old
City.  Besides  their  association  with  communal  vio-
lence, these urban zones are also economically and so-
cially  marginalised,  largely  inhabited  by  low-class
Muslims  and  low-caste  Hindus,  some  of  them  mi-
grants from other Indian regions.3 These demographic
characterisations  are  far  from  sociologically  static,
and are of  great  relevance in terms of  how specific
gender and socio-economic relations sustain or sub-
vert the logic of a communal order.
Drawing on selected interviews with residents of the
Old City, the first section discusses the entanglements
of communal violence and everyday gender and socio-
economic relations. 
The second section discusses the relevance of popu-
lar religious festivals celebrated in the city of Hyder-
abad for making sense of the gender-socio-economic
logic of communalism. It shows how statues of Hindu
gods displayed and paraded during such events have
3 For a detailed demographic account of Hyderabad’s Old 
City see Naidu (1990). On the Muslim population of Hyder-
abad’s Old City see Rao and Thaha (2012).
changed in connection with the growing visibility of
Hindutva organisations in the socio-political arena.4 As
the  idols  increasingly  embody  aggressive  masculine
models, they come to actualise the intersecting gen-
der-based and socio-economic regulating principles of
communalism. This section relies mostly on the analy-
sis  of  photos  taken  during  the  annual  Ganesh
Chaturthi.5
1.1 The Multiple Intersecting Dimensions of 
Communal Violence
The  connection  between  communalism  and  caste/
class  dynamics  has  been  explored  in  a  number  of
studies in Indian historical sociology (Aloysius 2010;
Roy 2018; Shani 2007; Teltumbde 2005). This literature
shows how the reproduction of a Brahminical social
order relies on the erasure of socio-economic stratifi-
cation as a focal point for political action and on the
mobilisation  of  the  lower  castes  and  classes  in  the
context of communal conflicts. In that respect, Ilaiah’s
analysis of  Hindutva is powerful exposé of how caste
factors into India’s communal politics:
Suddenly since about 1990 the word “Hindutva” has be-
gun to echo in our ears, day in and day out, as if every-
one in India who is not a Muslim, a Christian or a Sikh
is a Hindu. I am being told that I am a Hindu. I am also
told that my parents, relatives and the caste in which
we were born and brought up are Hindu (Ilaiah 1996, xi).
Adding to Ilaiah’s perspective, Tharu and Niranjana
discuss how both gender and caste function as organ-
ising principles of the Indian nation-scape: 
the shaping of the normative human-Indian subject in-
volved  […]  its  coding  as  upper-caste,  middle-class,
Hindu and male. The coding was effected by processes
of  othering/differentiation  such  as,  for  example,  the
definition of  upper-caste/class  female  respectability  in
counterpoint to lower-caste licentiousness, or Hindu tol-
erance to Muslim fanaticism as well as by a gradual and
sustained transformation of the institutions that govern
everyday life (Tharu and Niranjana 1994, 96). 
4 Hindutva refers both to the ideology of the Hindu right 
and to the various political and cultural organisations that 
contribute to its promotion and reproduction.
5 The Ganesh Chaturthi is a ten-day religious festival dedi-
cated to Lord Ganesh It has grown over the past twenty 
years thanks to the increasing involvement of trusts linked 
to right-wing Hindu organisations. On the final day devo-
tees join a procession to immerse Ganesh idols in water – 
generally lakes, ponds, rivers. In big cities like Mumbai and 
Hyderabad, huge Ganesh statues are installed across the 
city.
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This  paper  seeks  to  unpack  the  mechanisms
whereby intersecting gender and socio-economic di-
mensions configure the everyday forms and contexts
of communal violence. The terms intersection and in-
tersectionality  are  here  employed  as  a  framework
that, as Banerjee and Ghosh (2018, 8) suggest, must
be  capable  of  unveiling  specific,  contextual  experi-
ences  of  oppression.  Thus,  intersectionality  emerges
here in the actual practices and spaces of marginality
and violence, making visible both the mechanisms of
their  normalisation  and  the  experience  of  living
within, through and despite them. In that sense, ev-
eryday life becomes the – albeit fragmented – privi-
leged context for reading communalism in light of the
gender-socio-economic order. 
1.2 The Politics of Communal Violence and 
Everyday Life in Hyderabad
Together  with other  Indian  cities,  Hyderabad – the
capital of the southern Indian state of Telangana – is
considered  communally-sensitive  (Varshney  2003).6
This  characterisation  refers  to  the  occurrence  of
episodes of violence between religious communities in
conjunction with major political, cultural or religious
events. It applies in particular to the Old City, which
is now a majority Muslim area inhabited mainly by
socio-economically relegated groups (Rao and Thaha
2012, 191–92).7  
While the Old City presents the complexity of a so-
cio-economically  and  politically  neglected  social
space,  the  northern  parts  of  Hyderabad  (Secunder-
abad and the so-called New City) have developed into
6 See for example, Prem Panicker, “In Hyderabad: ‘Old City’ 
and ‘Communally Sensitive’ Are Conjoined”, Rediff  News, 18
May 2007, httip://specials.rediff .com/news/2007/may/
21sld1.htm; Sushi Rao, “The Communal Divide Cleaves 
Charminar Country”, Rediff  News, 19 February 1998, httip://
www.rediff .com/news/1998/feb/19hyder.htm; J. S. Ifthhekhar, 
“Sittiing Perpetually on a Powder Keg”, The Hindu, 19 Febru-
ary 2009, httip://www.thehindu.com/2003/12/08/stories/
20 03012008100 500300.htm. All accessed 2 October 2018.
7 Hyderabad was the capital of the homonymous princely 
state, with the area now called Old City forming the centre 
of the court’s economic, cultural and political life. Afther the 
state’s integration into independent India in 1948, the Old 
City lost its prestige and increasingly became identified as a
Muslim slum. It continued to bear relevance for Hyder-
abad’s cultural and historical identity, however, and became
a stronghold of Muslim political representation (Rao and 
Thaha 2012, 191–94).
a modern international IT hub, with educational facil-
ities,  services  and employment  opportunities  in  the
formal economy – and devoid of the stigma of com-
munalism attached to the Old City. In that sense, Hy-
derabad’s  urban geography reveals  how communal-
ism works to configure spatial boundaries of privilege
and marginalisation. 
Indeed, communal violence is acted out in the spa-
tial organising of urban areas, the unfolding of family
and social relations, and the forms of political repre-
sentation. In particular, it plays a role in (re)marginal-
ising certain social groups and in channelling or de-
fusing pressure for social change. This has direct im-
plications for the lives of those who work and live in
the Old City and other so-called “riot-prone” areas. 
According to almost all interviewed residents of riot-
affected  neighbourhoods,  episodes  of  violence  are
largely politically organised and perpetrated by goon-
das.8 At  the  same  time,  the  religious  community
emerges as the primary social space outside the fam-
ily. Accounts of everyday life in communally sensitive
areas portray a context deeply affected by a legacy of
Hindu/Muslim  violence  and  constituted  by  endan-
gered and mutually antagonist religious communities.
While relating their personal experience of communal
riots, residents of Sultan Shahi neighbourhood told of
entire families either leaving their homes and shops
for good or finding them occupied or burned down
upon their return. They highlighted how the housing
patterns in these areas reflected the resettling of peo-
ple  previously  living  in  mixed  neighbourhoods  and
later moving to and contributing to the emergence of
religiously homogenous zones: 
Riots take place because people from outside come here
to start the violence. Political leaders pay goondas from
other communities to engage in violence. They do this
to get popular. (Interview with S., Sultan Shahi, Hydera-
bad, 13 August 2009) 
Some  people  commit  violence  to  take  revenge,  for
money, to loot. If they know they will be safe after this
they will do it. They select innocent people […] 
People  left  their  homes.  Children  stopped  going  to
school. We stopped visiting the other community. (Inter-
view with A., Sultan Shahi, Hyderabad, 27 August 2009) 
Many of the interviewees also highlighted the nega-
tive consequences of curfews imposed in connection
8 Individuals, ofthen involved in pettiy or major criminal activ-
ities who use force and threats to settile disputes or protect 
vested interests. 
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with riots.  As most households survive on the daily
wages of  rickshaw drivers  or  casual  labourers,  days
and  weeks  of  curfew  mean  losing  access  to  basic
goods such as water, food and medicines.
When riots happen curfew is imposed. There is no food.
Food and medicine cost too much. Life is very difficult.
All shops are closed. (Interview with N., Sultan Shahi,
Hyderabad, 25 August 2010) 
In such circumstances, the inadequate and at times
non-existent  state-based relief  is  partly  replaced  by
that of charities, NGOs, and – mostly – political par-
ties or organisations. 
Riots are organised by political leaders. Then curfew is
imposed  and  families  here  suffer  greatly  so  they  get
help from political leaders. They [politicians] cause the
violence but also sustain and protect us afterwards. (In-
terview with M., Sultan Shahi, 1 September 2010)
In this  us one could read the wider social space of
the poor and riot-affected, although aid offered by po-
litical  organisations  is  often  faith-based  and  ad-
dressed to a specific religious community. The above
quotes  are  quite  representative  of  how residents  of
riot-hit  areas  experienced communal  violence.  Their
sense of increasing vulnerability did not relate only to
the threat of violence but also to the impending dan-
ger to their livelihoods. While this is a question often
left unaddressed in analyses of communalism, I con-
tend here that the socio-economic impact of riots on
already marginalised communities is not incidental to
communalism but integral to its functioning and con-
stitutive of the social order. 
Sultan Shahi is a very poor neighbourhood. Only speak-
ing about peace does not mean anything to the people.
Respect and support for our people means we must be
able to overcome our  economic difficulties.  Only then
you can speak about peace. (Interview with M., Sultan
Shahi, Hyderabad, 1 September 2009) 
In fact, the words of Sultan Shahi’s residents seem
to suggest that the normalisation of communal poli-
tics – theorised by Paul Brass as an “institutionalized
riot  system”  (1997)  –  also  keeps  socio-economically
disadvantaged communities in a state of tension and
deprivation, which limits their access to basic services
and the possibility to express a political consciousness
outside the  communal one provided by political par-
ties and organisations engaged – as Shani frames it –
in  “civic  defence  and  relief  for  riots  victims”  (2007,
153). In that context, pressure for social change and
demands for socio-economic improvement are mainly
absorbed by the religious communities and their (hos-
tile) relations with one another.   
In fact, a deeper look at this context reveals that the
socio-economic marginality at the heart of communal
violence is inseparable from the gendered logic that
sustains the social order. In Hyderabad’s Old City, like
in many social contexts in India, issues of authority
and dependence within the family – that often result
in relations of super/subordination based on gender,
age and kin – are linked to the expectation that men
provide for and defend the family.9 This happens de-
spite the fact that most lower class and caste women
engage in productive labour inside and occasionally
also outside the domestic space. In these contexts, the
possibility  to  act  upon the  conflict  situation  seems
contingent upon the possibility to reconfigure the so-
cio-economic and gender order.
In fact, the pressure put on families’ everyday suste-
nance when the danger of communal violence looms
outside the religious community’s boundaries appar-
ently puts the gendered division of labour on tempo-
rary  hold.  While  control  on  women’s  mobility  be-
comes tighter, partly in the name of protecting them
from the danger of sexual violence,10 they also become
responsible for fulfilling the family’s basic needs. 
During riots and curfew we cannot move much, we can-
not go out of our community […] men stay hidden at
home because police will arrest them, so women and the
elderly must go out to look for food and medicine. (In-
terview with M., Sultan Shahi, Hyderabad, 1 September
2009)
And yet, M.’s words suggest that, far from subvert-
ing gendered hierarchies, emergency situations actu-
ally exacerbate their regulating logic within families,
neighbourhoods and religious communities. The fact
that women and the elderly become responsible for
providing for the family does not really challenge so-
cial hierarchies based on intersecting gender, age and
socio-economic dimensions. At times of crises, while
9 For an analysis of masculinities in India see George (2006).
10 In India, sexual violence is a recurring issue in connection 
with communal riots: one common narrative is that riots are
triggered by rumours of sexual abuse or by “eve-teasing” of 
a female member or members of the other community. See 
for example httip://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/kolkata/
jamshedpur-tense-afther-communal-flareup/
article704520845.ece; httip://tribune.com.pk/story/6010835/com-
munal-violence-claims-21-lives-in-india/ (accessed on 30 Au-
gust 2015). For a focus on Hyderabad see Kakar (1996, 34–
35).
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young men fight to defend and protect the commu-
nity, women and the elderly ensure the reproduction
of the domestic/community hearth as the safe social
space. 
In such contexts, where control on their bodies and
mobility becomes central to the reproduction of the
religious  community,  women come up with specific
strategies to overcome strict norms generated by the
combined effect of oppressive gender and socio-eco-
nomic  relations.  A  conversation  with  a  group  of
women enrolled in vocational training in the “commu-
nity  development”  programmes  run  by  the  Henry
Martyn Institute (HMI) in Sankar Nagar was particu-
larly illuminating in this respect. 11 
First,  the teachers [women] talked to the parents and
other relatives to present the activities. Then, we started
to come to the Centre with our father or elder brother …
or the teachers picked us up from home. Last, we be-
came friends with the other students and we started to
move  in  groups  …  sometimes  someone’s  younger
brother accompanied us but at other times it was just
us. (Conversation in a women’s group in Sankar Nagar,
2 June 2011) 
For some of them, increasing mobility was later ex-
tended to other outings not related to the centre’s ac-
tivities (ibid.).  The process unfolded in a constant ne-
gotiation  of  gender,  socio-economic  and,  ultimately,
interfaith relations. The picture they made of their po-
sition within the neighbourhood was strongly linked
to  the  tensions  their  activities  generated  when  at-
tempting to break through the social,  economic and
gender  boundaries  reinforced  in  the  context  of  the
communal divide. 
It took some time for the community to understand that
we were visiting families to do the mehndi on happy oc-
casions.12 People used to wonder what our association
with a certain family was, why we were going there. (In-
terview with  N.,  who helped to establish  a small  but
successful  house-to-house  mehndi business,  Sankar
Nagar, 2 June 2011)
For some of  these women, building interfaith dia-
logue  seemed  inseparable  from issues  of  socio-eco-
nomic and gender justice in the family, the neighbour-
11 The Henry Martyn Institute is an international centre for 
research, interfaith relations and reconciliation located in 
Hyderabad. Besides its academic activities, it runs commu-
nity development and peace-building projects in conflict-
torn areas in India and South Asia httip://www.hmiindia.-
com/ 
12 Henna decorations that women traditionally apply to 
their hands and feet on festive occasions
hood and the wider social and political  contexts. In
the words of a school teacher trained by and working
in another HMI programme in Sultan Shahi: 
First  of  all,  we  [women]  need  to  work.  Going  to  the
Aman Shanti13 centre [where HMI conducts its activities
in Sultan Shahi], learning a job or teaching is important
to sustain our families. Also, our personality grows be-
cause we get out of our homes and interact with other
people.  Third,  we feel  we are  helping  to  build  a new
community,  in  which  Hindus  and  Muslims  can  live
peacefully  together.  (Interview  with  M.,  Sultan  Shahi,
Hyderabad, 1 September 2009) 
These accounts show how the intersection of gender
and socio-economic norms contributes to drawing re-
ligious community boundaries and how communal vi-
olence plays a role in (re)marginalising specific sec-
tions of society to sustain the social order. They also
offer a glimpse into the individual and collective ac-
tions  that  constantly  interrogate  this  very order,  as
they call into question the way masculinities and fem-
ininities are acted out in the communal logic with re-
spect to their location within the family and the com-
munity. Women’s practices that bridge religious and
caste/class segregation are particularly relevant in this
respect as they expose and thus subvert the mutually
constitutive relations between communal violence and
the gender-socio-economic governance.
2 Pious Warriors, Muscular Gods: Violent 
Masculinities and the Religious Community
The experience of communal violence in everyday life
also permeates rituals, religious festivals and anniver-
saries that come to be regarded as communally-sensi-
tive. Indeed, their association with communalism ef-
fects changes in the practices, imagery and symbol-
ism around the religious community. In certain cases,
the danger of violence becomes integral to the event,
with security measures and the police becoming char-
acterising elements.14 At the symbolic level,  violence
gets  embedded  in  specific  figures  embodying  the
community, its internal organisation and its external
boundaries. This section unpacks the intersections of
gender and socio-economic dimensions in these reli-
gious  communities’  practices  and how they become
central to a politics of communal violence. It proposes
13 Aman and Shanti are the Urdu and Hindi words for peace.
14 On the ritualization of violence in “communal” conflicts 
see Féron and Hastings (2003).
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an argument linking the figure of the pehlwan (Indian
traditional wrestlers) with the changes in iconic repre-
sentations of Hindu gods during religious festivals.15  
In  his  work on  the 1990 riots  in  Hyderabad,  Kakar
highlights the pehlwans’ sense of loyalty to their reli-
gious community as they trained at dedicated gyms
belonging to local organisations linked to the All India
Majlis  Ittehadul  Muslimeen  (AIMIM)  or  the  Sangh
Parivar (1996, 81–85).16 While the wrestling tradition
is not necessarily associated with interreligious antag-
onism, the wrestlers’ training is imbued with religious
zeal  and a sense  of  morality.  They are occasionally
hired by local businessmen and/or politicians to par-
ticipate in riots, settle land disputes or gain political
leverage through the threat or actual use of violence.
In the context of communalism, the pehlwans come to
embody an idealised masculinity – the strong, pious
warrior, protector of the community (Kakar 1996, 52–
86; Brass 2004). Their violence epitomises the response
to a perceived external threat and reaffirms the com-
munity’s unity around a strong masculine figure who
embodies  violence  and tolerance,  religious  zeal  and
body building, reflecting the multiple positionings the
pehlwan must accommodate within the space of the
religious  community.  Such  hybridity  is  particularly
striking when this figure is incorporated in represen-
tations of Hindu gods during religious festivals.17 This
particular version of the wrestler – serving the pur-
poses of a communal logic – cuts across not only reli-
gious but also socio-economic and gender dimensions,
structuring a Hindu social hierarchy and positioning
it vis-à-vis the non-Hindus.
The statues exhibited during the  Ganesh Chaturthi
in Hyderabad represent a case in point.18 This festival
15 Indian wrestling was widespread in the northern part of 
the Subcontinent, in Bengal, Maharashtra and in the 
princely state of Hyderabad where the art was patronised 
by the prince (Kakar 1996, 82–83). 
16 AIMIM (previously MIM) is a Hyderabad-based Muslim 
political party that has a strong electoral basis in the Old 
City area. Sangh Parivar is an umbrella organisation of 
Hindu Right groups, and a central proponent of the Hin-
dutva ideology.
17 This is in line with Demetriou’s definition of masculinity 
as a “hybrid bloc that unites practices from diverse mas-
culinities in order to ensure the reproduction of patriarchy” 
(Demetriou 2001, 337).
18 The crowded parades, backed by a whole year of commu-
nity fundraising, were introduced in Hyderabad at the end 
has grown in the city and other parts of South India
in the past twenty years and has been widely associ-
ated with attempts by certain sections of the Hindutva
movement to reinforce the image of a homogeneous
and strong Hindu identity. As the celebrations have
grown, some representations of deities have lost their
classical androgynous features in favour of muscular
bodies that evoke the figure of the wrestler (see Fig-
ures  3  and  4).  In  2010,  Begum Bazar  –  a  majority
Hindu neighbourhood and a popular shopping area –
became the site of a massive Ganesh Pandal (the plat-
form where the statue is installed) carrying the label
“Ganesh Pehlwan”. During the religious parades of the
ten-day  festival  in  September  2009 and 2010,  many
similar large statues appeared all around the city of
Hyderabad. These representations have particular sig-
nificance  in  terms  of  religious  symbolism.  Ganesh’s
traditional round belly represents bounty and harm-
lessness, the god being commonly regarded as benev-
olent and deeply moved by the affection and faith of
the devotees. By transforming Ganesh into an aggres-
sive, muscular god in the context of a festival strongly
associated with Hindu identity  politics,  the  cultural
and political  groups providing for  the realisation of
such  statues  resituated  the  Hindu  community
through a  specific  understanding  of  Ganesh’s  sym-
bolic role within Hinduism. This is significant, as the
festival was and is still considered “communally-sensi-
tive” both in Hyderabad and other Indian cities.19 In
these representations, the symbols around which Hin-
duism is  homogenised  and through which  religious
difference is affirmed present a strong gender conno-
tation defined by a combination of violent masculinity
and religious piety. 
In  a  way,  the  very  capacity  for  violence  that  the
Ganesh pehlwan embodies actualises a powerful and
assertive masculinity within the religious community.
The nexus wrestler/Lord Ganesh/religious community
of the 1970s by the then Congress Chief Minister Chenna 
Reddy, who used to participate in the final procession and 
address the devotees. See, (Engineer 1984; Engineer 1991).
19 “18 held during Mumbai Ganesh Chaturthi violence”, In-
dian Express, 20 September 2000, httip://www.indianexpress.-
com/Storyold/1600254/, “Violence Erupts on Ganesh 
Chaturthi”, Times of India, 1 September 2003, httip://arti-
cles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2003-09-01/ahmedabad/
2702120339_1_borsad-town-ganesh-chaturthi-kodinar; both 
accessed 27 November 2018. On Hyderabad see Naidu (1990,
127–38) and Narendranath (1984, 19–20).
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in these particular imageries is linked to a discourse
of hostile interfaith relations. This in turn feeds into
the wider Hindutva political agenda reflecting a socio-
economic hierarchy within the religious community.
In fact, some of the statues of an aggressive Ganesh
carry attributes of Lord Rama (bow and arrow) or are
associated  with  a  muscular  Hanuman,  the  monkey
god and Lord Rama’s devoted disciple (Figures 1–4).
Together with Ganesh, Rama and Hanuman occupy a
central place in the Hindutva mythology. The latter in
particular is associated with the Adivasi (tribal/indige-
nous) people in India (Puniyani 2009). Some sections
amongst them have subscribed to the anti-Christian
and anti-Muslim rhetoric  of  the Hindu Right,  espe-
cially with the growth of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) – the political wing of  Hindutva  – towards the
end of the 1990s. According to Lobo, the participation
of certain sections of Adivasi communities in the 2002
anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat should be understood
in the context, and as an integral part of the growing
initiatives for  social  mobility  and ensuing stratifica-
tion among these very communities as they enter the
socio-economic  logic  of  caste  (Lobo 2002).20 As  also
20 A similar argument can explain the relative success of 
Hindutva among OBCs (Other Backward Castes) and Dalits 
(Jaff relot 2000, 86; Teltumbde 2005). Dalit refers to “untouch-
able” caste groups. See Ilaiah for a perspective on caste-re-
lated terminology in India (1996, vii–ix).
discussed by Julia Eckert, focusing on the opportuni-
ties  for  upward  social  mobility  can  help  to  explain
why some sections  within the groups discriminated
against in the Hindu social order would subscribe to
the Hindutva ideology (Eckert 2009). 
The masculine, warrior-like versions of Ganesh thus
recast  old  socio-economic  relations,  creating  a  new
mythology of Hinduism that serves the purposes of
the  contemporary  social  and  political  discourse.  A
muscular Hanuman carrying Ganesh on his shoulders
or kneeling at the feet of Ganesh-Rama reflects the
ambiguous inclusiveness of a violent  Hindutva  ideol-
ogy,  reaching  out  to  the  marginalised  within  Hin-
duism by displacing tensions concerning the social hi-
erarchy onto the “Muslim body”. 
Specifically in Hyderabad, the increase in the num-
ber  of  Ganesh pehlwans  during  the September  2010
festival followed a wave of communal riots in March
of the same year. The incidents happened in conjunc-
tion with  Hanuman Jayanthi,  a festival organised by
local branches of Hindutva groups that was celebrated
in the city with a procession for the first  time that
year. During the same period, a movement for a sepa-
rate Telangana state was gaining visibility at the polit-
ical level in opposition to the political and economic
Figure 1: A massive Pandal at Kairatabad, with a 
traditional representation of Ganesh 
Hyderabad, July 2009 (Photograph by the author)
Figure 2: Children dance on the Pandal of a 
Ganesh pehlwan
Asaf Jahi Road, Hyderabad, September 2010 (Photo-
graph by the author)
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dominance of  the Andhra region’s  elites.21 The year
2010  saw  the  strengthening  of  the  Hindu  Right’s
rhetoric, which progressively endorsed the cause of a
separate Telangana state. Parallel to this, space for the
critical  voices  of  marginalised  sections  such  as
women, Dalits, Adivasis and Muslims was reduced. 
Within the movement many are reluctant to leave space
to women, Dalits and minorities in general […] we are
very active, especially in districts. Dalits feel the move-
ment is dominated by upper-caste people especially at
the level of the elites. It is in the universities that Dalits
and backward castes are mostly active but they don’t
find  space  in  the  leadership.  (Interview  with  F.,  a
Muslim woman active in the movement for a separate
Telangana state, Hyderabad, 23 May 2011..)
The March 2010 riots took place at a time when these
groups’ political activism was converging and organis-
ing  within  the  movement  for  a  separate  Telangana
state.  In response to that,  the struggle for  the geo-
graphic  and  political  reorganisation  of  the  state  –
whose  roots  date  back  to  the  time  of  Hyderabad
state’s  forceful  integration  into  the  newly  indepen-
21 The state of Telangana was until June 2014 a region of the 
state of Andhra Pradesh. The Telugu speaking people of 
Telangana had for long mobilised for recognition of their so-
cio-economic, cultural and language rights. The most recent 
mobilisation for a separate Telangana state gained momen-
tum in 2009. 
dent India – underwent a reconfiguration at the level
of leadership and rhetoric, with the upper castes and
classes monopolising positions of power. It  is telling
that a debate over interpretations of Hyderabad’s his-
tory sparked by the emerging Telangana movement
turned into  a  controversy, centered  on  a  Hindu vs.
Muslim political debate.22 
There is also the issue of history and how it is used to
marginalise the Muslims. Muslims feel history should be
re-read  and  re-written  because  the  mainstream inter-
pretations propose a derogatory image of the Muslims.
(Interview with F., Hyderabad, 23 May 2011.) 
The spread of the  Ganesh-pehlwan in the religious
processions was thus concomitant with the reaffirma-
tion of a communal political discourse over the gen-
der-socio-economic governance of a new geographical
and political formation. The figure reaffirms the unity
of the Hindu community around a hierarchy of mas-
culinities,  repositioning  different  sections  of  society
and  displacing  internal  tensions  onto  an  outside
threat. In that sense, it defines the community’s rela-
tions  with  other  social  entities  in  exclusive  terms,
22 For an insightful illustration of the debate at the time see 
Anveshi Broadsheet on Contemporary Politics, vol 1, no. 1, 
httip://www.anveshi.org.in/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/
nizams_rule_broadsheet_english_nov_2010.pdf, accessed 27 
August 2015.
Figure 3: Lord Rama’s disciple Hanuman carrying 
Lord Ganesh on his shoulders
Beghum Bazar, Hyderabad, September 2010 (Photo-
graph by the author)
Figure 4: Lord Ganesh holding Lord Rama’s bow 
and arrow, Hanuman kneeling at his feet
Hyderabad, September 2010 (Photograph by the au-
thor)
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while negotiating a position of power in the wider so-
cial order. Finally, it homogenises the religious com-
munity as the unit for political struggle, erasing the
emergence of political consciousness at the intersec-
tion  of  gender  and  socio-economic  dimensions  and
naturalising the social control exercised through the
(danger of) communal violence. 
3 Conclusion
A perspective on how communal violence is shaped by
and contributes to shape power relations in the wider
social order provides some insights into its social and
political meaning. Violence reorganises the spaces, re-
lations and politics of everyday life. At the same time,
the  communalisation of the political discourse seems
to constrain the space and visibility of socio-political
consciousnesses among marginalised sections of soci-
ety. In that sense, the normalisation of communal vio-
lence displaces initiatives for social justice intersect-
ing gender and socio-economic axes of power into a
conflict  between  “religious  communities”.  As  the
Hindu-Muslim opposition becomes mainstreamed in
intellectual, political and everyday practices of inter-
faith-relations, the question of the roles of the state,
political  and  religious  organisations,  the  academia
and the media in reproducing a communalised version
of political violence and its constitutive gender-socio-
economic governance is only superficially addressed.
The same applies to the everyday experiences of com-
munalism  of  disadvantaged  social  groups  and  the
ways it intersects gender and socio-economic regula-
tory practices. While unfit for the overwhelmingly ac-
cepted connotation of interfaith relations, they offer a
glimpse into the systematic reorganising of the social
order and the possibility of its reconfiguration. 
Social, political and intellectual actions which inter-
rogate communalism must begin to address the en-
tanglements of contextual experiences of marginalisa-
tion and political violence and the intersecting dimen-
sions of power in the social order. Sticking with a un-
examined Hindu-Muslim dichotomy risks  contribut-
ing to the invisibility and reproduction of social hier-
archies and to the crystallisation of the very commu-
nal puzzle one wishes to unravel.
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